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This thesis examines the role U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is 
performing in the maritime domain as the new Unified Command responsible for 
homeland defense.  NORTHCOM does not currently have a permanent maritime 
component assigned for missions.  Instead, it relies on contingency planning for 
future events and theoretically acts as a coordinating bridge between the Navy 
and Coast Guard for Maritime Homeland Defense/ Security issues.   
The primary objective of this research is to answer the question: Can 
NORTHCOM effectively execute maritime homeland defense and support 
homeland security without having permanently assigned maritime forces?”   
Secondly, this thesis seeks to scrutinize the seam in transition from 
Maritime Homeland Security to Maritime Homeland Defense and explicate 
potential mission priority, service capability, geographic, and cultural mismatches 
which could potentially stymie command and control in the transition from a HLS 
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 This thesis will examine the role U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) 
is performing in the maritime domain as the new Unified Command responsible 
for homeland defense.  NORTHCOM does not currently have a permanent 
maritime component assigned for missions.  Instead, it relies on contingency 
planning for future events and theoretically acts as a coordinating bridge between 
the Navy and Coast Guard for Maritime Homeland Defense/ Security issues.  
This thesis asks and seeks to answer the question, “Can NORTHCOM effectively 
execute maritime homeland defense missions and support homeland security 
without having permanently assigned maritime forces?”   
B. BACKGROUND 
When Achilles, the Greek hero of Troy, was born, his mother, aimed to 
immortalize him by dipping him in the river Styx.  She immersed him, holding him 
by one heel but forgot to dip him a second time so the heel she held him by 
would get wet as well.  Consequently, the place where she held him remained 
untouched by the magic water of the Styx and that part stayed mortal or 
vulnerable. 
The United States has experienced an Achilles-like birth to the 
constellation of vulnerabilities within its homeland since September 11th, 2001.  
As of September 7, 2002, 3044 people are presumed dead resulting from the 
three successful attacks in New York and Washington D.C. and and fourth 
known failed attack over Pennsylvania.1  The economic impact from these 
attacks on the homeland is still debated.  Recently, a 29 May, 2003 Government 
Accounting Office report on the impact of the 2001 World Trade Center attack 
                                            
1 “September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attack/Casualties,” in Wikipedia [on-line encyclopedia] (2003 




estimated the direct and indirect costs between $54 and $84 billion.2  There is no 
known reliable estimate of the psychological costs.   
Among the vulnerabilities found and predicted as potential terrorist targets 
are approximately 350 seaports along 12,380 miles of U.S. coastline. These 
ports of entry include over 100 major ports, points of embarkation and 
debarkation for military sealift, and many smaller unprotected harbors and piers.  
These seaports import and export approximately 96% of our trade.  An 
unchecked coordinated seaborne attack could exploit the Achilles Heel of the 
U.S. if ports are shutdown to traffic in the same approach that U.S. airspace was 
shut down in the days that immediately followed the 9/11 attacks. 
Like Achilles’ mother, the Bush Administration and Congress have been 
harried in covering all conceivable vulnerabilities to the Nation’s security.  
Militarily, the Department Defense answer to the Homeland Security/ Defense 
quandary was the establishment of Northern Command on 1 October 2002, the 
first Unified Command assigned to consolidate existing missions of Homeland 
Security and Defense previously dispersed among the branches of the military. 
While there is a growing body of literature and debate reflecting on 
NORTHCOM’s presumed ground and air defense missions, there is little found 
regarding the maritime dimension.  The conventional wisdom in the existing body 
of literature is two-fold: (1) The Coast Guard is responsible for and becoming 
increasingly capable of maritime homeland security. (2) The Navy is already 
acting in the interest of homeland defense through forward presence operations 
and the Navy also has the capability to surge or sortie should the Secretary of 
Defense order them to do so for a homeland defense mission. 
Between maritime homeland security and homeland defense, however, 
there is a transition seam that has been relatively unexplored except through 
wargaming.  This transitive seam is where NORTHCOM will need to harmonize 
                                            
2 Government Accounting Office, Impact of Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center, GAO-





the Navy and Coast Guard missions if there were a coordinated maritime attack 
on the homeland at or near the magnitude of the 9/11 attacks.  
C. OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of this research is to answer the question: Can 
NORTHCOM effectively execute maritime homeland defense and support 
homeland security without having permanently assigned maritime forces?”   
Secondly, this thesis seeks to study the potential threats that could 
challenge NORTHCOM in the maritime domain.  This thesis also aims to 
scrutinize the seam in transition from Maritime Homeland Security to Maritime 
Homeland Defense and explicate potential mission priority, service capability, 
and cultural mismatches that could potentially stymie command and control in the 
transition from a HLS to HLD posture in the event of a seaborne terrorist attack. 
This thesis will attempt to help inform and assist maritime homeland 
security and defense policy makers in determining whether or not the current 
maritime defense support apparatus in place is sufficient to achieve a timely 
transition from homeland security to homeland defense.            
D. METHODOLOGY 
Major sources for this thesis will include domestic journal analyses, and 
published assessments by government and non-government “think tanks,” and 
reports from ongoing operations in support of maritime homeland security/ 
defense. 
Published results and policy recommendations from the Naval 
Postgraduate School 2001 and 2003 Maritime Security/ Defense Wargames3 will 
be used to mirror this study and serve as validation points for operational 
concepts or uncover potential flaws in the current system.  Telephone and if 
travel is authorized, personal interviews will be conducted with officers from 
NORTHCOM, the Navy, and the Coast Guard. 
                                             
3The Naval Postgraduate School hosted a Maritime Homeland Security Wargame in 2001 and a 
2003 Maritime Homeland Security/ Defense wargame sponsored jointly by the U.S. Navy and 
U.S. Coast Guard.  Both games tested interoperability between various federal, state, and civilian 





NORTHCOM is assigned a 500nm boundary along the U.S. coasts as the 
maritime boundary zone of its area of responsibility.  Chapter II serves to 
delineate the scope of the maritime threat to the U.S. within this 500nm 
boundary.  The threat ranges in scope from a low impact attack by way of small 
boat attacks or harbor mining; medium impact attacks from hijacked vessels 
converted into weapons employed against vulnerable targets within ports; and 
high impact attacks from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) transported via 
container and detonated in or beyond a U.S. port.  Several successful and foiled 
terrorist maritime attacks have occurred both before and after September 11, 
2001.  These attempts are presented to reinforce the capability and intent for 
potential future terrorist maritime operations. 
Chapter III will define the Maritime Homeland Security (MHLS) and 
Maritime Home Land Defense (MHLD) missions.  NORTHCOM’s mission and 
dual roles also will be outlined here.  Its first role is to provide support for 
Homeland Security by acting as a coordination center and force provider for Civil 
Support.  Its second and primary role is to serve as the theater commander for 
Homeland Defense in the event there is another attack on the Continental U.S.  
While this is a solid mission for commanding various National Guard and other 
land defense elements among the continental states, is this construct effective 
for maritime defense?  Additionally, there is an apparent seam between 
NORTHCOMS’s MHLS and MHLD missions that requires scrutiny.  This seam 
will be studied and defined here. This chapter will also outline the maritime 
defense chain of command to the component level of the Navy and Coast Guard 
and explain how the Navy and Coast Guard comprise a “notional”4 National 
Fleet.  They are two clearly separate organizations with dissimilar missions and 
cultures.  The Maritime Defense Zone (MARDEZ) concept, established during 
                                            
4 The term notional is added here because there has not been a true national fleet for coastal 
defense since World War II.  The national fleet concept was developed during the Cold War via 
the Maritime Defense Zone (MARDEZ) which was intended to activate Coast Guard and Navy 
elements under Coast Guard command in the event of  a maritime attack on the U.S.   Note that 




the Cold War, married these two maritime forces under one command in the 
event of an attack on the homeland.  Now, under NORTHCOM both forces are 
required to respond to a homeland attack in similar fashion.  Specifically, U.S. 
Navy and U.S. Coast Guard mission priorities before and after 9/11 will be 
examined. 
Chapter IV examines the competing mission priorities the cultural 
challenges for NORTHCOM in the maritime domain.  This chapter compares and 
contrasts the differences in mission priorities between the Navy and Coast Guard 
in the MHLS/ MHLD mission before and after 9/11.  Specifically, this chapter 
seeks to highlight the tension between focusing on a home vs. away game 
strategy.  This chapter also queries whether or not competing capability and 
cultural mismatches exist between the Navy and the Coast Guard maritime 
forces. 
In Chapter V, two case studies providing insights into the challenges 
facing NORTHCOM are reviewed.  Operation Noble Eagle is the first and 
continuing homeland defense operation that has a maritime dimension.  The 
November 2001 Maritime Homeland Security Wargame, held at NPS in 
Monterey, was the first maritime wargame since 9/11 engaging Navy and Coast 
Guard staffs as well as federal and other stakeholders.  The April, 2003 Maritime 
Homeland Security/ Defense Wargame, also held at NPS, was the first such 
wargame since the establishment of NORTHCOM.  Between these two 
wargames, valuable lessons have been learned to help deal with future attacks 
including worst-case scenarios.  This chapter will examine these cases and 
present them within the context of the current maritime chain of command/ 
authority under NORTHCOM as a test against the original thesis question. 
The concluding chapter summarizes some of the challenges for 
NORTHCOM in the maritime dimension of Homeland Defense and Security.  
This chapter also reviews the research questions, suggests some 
recommendations for closing the seams in the MHLS/ MHLD missions, and 


















II. THREATS TO THE MARITIME DOMAIN 
A. SCOPE OF MARITIME THREAT TO HOMELAND SECURITY 
NORTHCOM is assigned a 500nm off-shore boundary along the U.S. 
coasts as the maritime boundary zone of its area of responsibility.  In this 
chapter, the thesis will review the scope of the maritime threat to the U.S. within 
this 500nm boundary in context to recent international maritime terrorist activities. 
The threat ranges in scope from a low impact attack by way of small boat 
attacks; medium impact attacks from smuggling weapons by sea or hijacked 
vessels converted into weapons against vulnerable targets within ports; and high 
impact attacks from weapons of mass destruction transported via container and 
detonated in or beyond a U.S. port. 
Several successful and foiled terrorist maritime attacks have occurred 
both before and after September 11, 2001.  These attempts are presented to 
reinforce the capability and intent for future potential terrorist maritime 
operations. 
The Maritime threat to Homeland Security is a clear and present danger. 
While no recorded terrorist attacks have occurred in the maritime domain of the 
United States, several milestone events point to a trend in potential synergy by 
terrorists against U.S. maritime target sets. 
B. LOW IMPACT THREAT 
For this thesis, a low impact threat is defined as any single attack 
conducted against a maritime target which inflicts less than 100 casualties, will 
not disrupt the economy, and creates little psychological impact on the 
homeland.  While there have not yet been any known low impact maritime 
attacks within NORTHCOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR), low impact attacks 
have been attempted internationally.  The attempted plot against the USS The 
Sullivans, the successful attack against the USS Cole, and the successful attack 
on the French MV Limburg, are all pointers to the potential of future maritime 




1. The Sullivans 
On 3 January 2000, the USS The Sullivans berthed in Aden Harbor, 
Yemen for refueling and provisions while enroute to the Arabian Gulf.  The ship 
topped off and proceeded to the Arabian Gulf, rendezvousing with the John F. 
Kennedy Battle Group, where she conducted Maritime Intercept Operations.  The 
Sullivans successfully completed her deployment and returned to Mayport, 
Florida in March of 2000 without incident. 
That morning in Aden, while The Sullivans was being serviced, 
conspirators loaded a boat with explosives and launched the boat from the 
beach. The conspirators aborted the attack because of a miscalculation.  The 
loaded explosives displaced too much weight and the boat sank in the harbor 
under the weight of the explosives. 
The crew was unaware, until an FBI investigation into the USS Cole 
incident, that they narrowly escaped an attack that would have likely sunk the 
ship.  The Sullivans was the target of an Al Qaeda assault by Jamal Ahmed 
Mohammed Ali Al-Badawi and Fahd al-Quso.  Both have been charged by the 
U.S. Department of Justice “with 50 counts of various terrorism offenses, 
including murder of U.S. nationals and murder of U.S. military personnel.”5 
The terrorists eventually regrouped and returned to Aden after the aborted 
mission.  They salvaged the explosives, re-enforced the hull of their attack boat, 
and installed additional fuel tanks.6   They then waited patiently ten months for 
their next window of opportunity for an assault.  
2. USS Cole 
On 12 October 2000, nearly ten months after the failed attack on the 
Sullivans, the Yemen cell of Al Qaeda successfully attacked the USS Cole.  Like 
The Sullivans, Cole was berthed in Aden Harbor for a brief stop for fuel (BSF). 
                                            
5United States Department of Justice Official Press Release, “Al Qaeda Associates Charged In 
Attack On USS Cole, Attempted Attack On Another U.S. Naval Vessel,” [on-line report] (15 
August 2003 [cited 20 August 2003]); available from World Wide Web @  http://www.usdoj.gov 
6Curt Anderson, “Terrorism Charges Brought in USS Cole Bombing,” [on-line magazine] (15 May 




At 0515 (EST), two men approached the port side amidships of the Cole in 
a small boat, stood up at attention, and detonated the explosives aboard the craft 
penetrating the hull of the Cole.  The attack claimed 17 dead and 39 injured 
service members.7  Like The Sullivans, the Cole was two months into her 
deployment and bound for the Arabian Gulf in support of ongoing forward 
presence operations in that theater. 
3. MV Limburgh 
At 0915 on 06 October, 2002 a second successful small boat attack was 
executed  in Yemen.  This time the target was the MV Limburg, a French oil 
tanker, anchored at the port of Ash Shihr, at Mukallah, 353 miles east of Aden.  
MV Limburg had just loaded heavy crude in Iran and was at anchor, awaiting a 
harbor pilot, to enter the deep draft port of Ash Shihr to complete her load. 
In an account of the incident by the Captain, "A junior officer saw a craft 
approaching the Limburg. He was of the opinion that we touched that craft and 
then there was an explosion."8 The tanker was reported by witnesses as having 
been struck along the starboard quarter by the small craft, followed by an 
explosion.  The impact of the explosion “pierced both hulls and penetrated 7-8 
metres into the cargo hold, which was loaded with crude oil.”9 
All but one of the 25 crew members were accounted for with only minor 
injuries when they abandoned ship after the fire spread out of control.  90,000 
barrels of the 397,00 barrels of crude oil already aboard were lost.  In a follow-on 
report “The militant Yemeni Islamic group Aden-Abyan Islamic Army has claimed 
responsibility. . .The group sent a statement to the daily Asharq al-Awsat 
newspaper, saying a US frigate had been the original target.10  However, the 
                                            
7United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000, [on-line document] (30 
April 2001 [cited 28 August 2003]); available from World Wide Web @ http://www.state.gov/ 
8British Broadcast Company, “Craft '’Rammed' Yemen Oil Tanker,” [on-line magazine] (06 
October 2002 [cited 02 September 2003]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
9Ibid. 
10British Broadcast Company, “TNT Found in Stricken Yemen Tanker,” [on-line magazine] (11 





similarities between the Limburg and Cole attacks suggest that Al Qaeda is the 
more likely group responsible. 
4. Analysis of Low Impact Threat 
Further attacks on this scale seem highly probable.  These attacks are 
more feasible and well within Al Qaeda’s capability.  Yemen, because it was not 
a hostile operating area for Al Qaeda, could be either viewed as an anomaly by 
optimists, or a testing ground for future operations of this nature against targets 
on the U.S. Homeland. 
The attacks took careful planning.  U.S. warships had already visited Aden 
as stated by General Tommy Franks, then Commanding General of Central 
Command, in his testimony before Congress on the USS Cole attack   “Since the 
U.S. Navy began refueling operations in Aden in January '99, Navy ships have 
conducted 27 brief stops for fuel (BSF), two port visits, and one logistics 
replenishment visit.”11 
With the follow-on attack on the MV Limburg, is perhaps a succcessful 
and escalating pattern is emerging?  This time, the attackers have proven that 
they can operate high-speed craft and may operate larger craft in order to carry 
more explosives.  While this is not a study on marine engineering, it makes 
sense that more explosives are required to penetrate a double-hulled ship than 
the 5” single hull of an Arleigh Burke Destroyer. 
Al Qaeda’s second successful maritime attack shifted from a hard target 
such as a warship to a soft target such as an oil-tanker which does not 
necessarily have very robust security measures as military targets.  Could this 
suggest that with the increase in force protection measures for Navy units 
overseas, Al Qaeda will pursue the path of least resistance and continue to 
attack soft targets?  If so, lessons from successful military force protection should 
be drawn and applied to the civilian sector. 
 
                                            
11 United States Department of State, “General Tommy Franks Testimony on USS Cole Attack,” 





C. MEDIUM IMPACT THREAT 
A Medium Impact Threat is defined by this thesis as any single or multiple 
attacks conducted against a maritime target which has the potential to inflict 
more than 100 but less than 1,000 casualties; will have some impact on the 
economy or intermodal system; and creates a significant psychological impact on 
the homeland.  While no known medium impact maritime attacks have yet 
occurred within NORTHCOM’s AOR, some medium impact attacks have been 
attempted internationally.  Weapons and explosives smuggling for terrorist 
operations is the most common operational link observed. 
1. Santorini Incident 
On 6 May 2001 an Israeli Air Force maritime patrol aircraft on routine 
patrol over the Mediterranean Sea, identified and reported a suspicious vessel, 
'Santorini', approaching Israeli waters.   Four Israeli patrol craft and missile boats 
were dispatched to intercept this small, 40-ton ship.  The Santorini was soon 
intercepted in international waters just outside the 12 nm territorial limit of Israel.  
The Israeli crews noticed on the Santorini's deck a large number of plastic barrels 
of different sizes common to smuggling operations.  
A preliminary search of the cargo revealed an extensive shipment 
of sophisticated weapons packed into watertight containers. The 
containers, resembling barrels, were to be dropped off the Gaza 
coast and floated by incoming tidal currents to the shore. A crew of 
four Lebanese men said that similar shipments had been delivered 
'safely' and revealed that the unsuccessful drop was their third 
voyage to Gaza.12 
A marine commando contingent of the IDF Navy's Special Forces unit was 
ordered to board and the ship was seized without incident.  The four crewmen 
aboard the 'Santorini' did not attempt to resist the takeover.  The vessel was 
escorted to Haifa, Israel.  Among the seized weapons were fifty 107mm 
Katyusha rockets, two 60mm light mortars with 98 rounds, 70 fragmentation 
mines, 20 RPG-7s, 120 anti-tank grenades, and 30 AK-47s with 13,000 rounds of 
standard 7.62mm ammunition.13 
                                            





Also found aboard were four Strella-2 surface-to-air missile launchers 
which, according to Jane’s is obsolete against military aircraft but still lethal 
against commercial aircraft not equipped with countermeasures.  
2. Karine “A”Affair 
On 3 January 2002 Israeli Defense Force (IDF) commandos raided and 
seized the Karine “A, ” a 4,000-ton cargo freighter, 400 miles from the Israeli 
coast in the Red Sea.  In an operation ironically named “Noah’s Ark,” the IDF 
seized over 50 tons of conventional weapons.  The arsenal reportedly included: 
dozens of 122mm and 107mm long range Katyusha rockets, hundreds of 
shorter-range 81 mm rockets, Mortars, SAGGER and RPG 18 anti-tank missiles, 
sniper rifles, AK-47 assault rifles, assorted anti-tank and anti- personnel mines, 
two Zodiac inflatable boats, and 3,000 pounds of C4 explosive.14 
The Karine “A” seizure revealed a sophisticated concealment and retrieval 
system used by the smugglers where the weapons are placed in airtight 
containers that have the capability of buoyancy and ballast.  The containers are 
dumped overboard and sunk, then later retrieved by divers on smaller boats.  
3. Analysis of Medium Impact Threat 
A medium impact attack seems unlikely against the U.S. at present but 
remains a concern for future operations.  For every successful intercept of these 
smuggling operations, one has to wonder how many already got through. 
Could Al Qaeda exploit our already vulnerable intermodal system of 
transportation? Drug and migrant smugglers continue to succeed at breaching 
the U.S. borders.  Could Al Qaeda or others smuggle weapons into the U.S. 
following similar methods to the smuggling operations in Israel?  Consider this 
scenario where a vessel from a trusted port with cargo flagged for customs 
dumps his undeclared cargo (the weapons) but just before entering port.  Al 
Qaeda has already demonstrated the intent to train divers for maritime 
operations.  If two men with one sniper rifle could cause chaos in the greater 
                                            
14Israeli Defense Force, “Inventory of the Weapons Seized on the Karine-A,” [on-line] (2002 




Washington D.C. area, imagine the impact of a Santorini or Karine “A” type 
delivery of a 50-ton cache of weapons to a drop point near a U.S. port. 
D. HIGH IMPACT THREAT 
A High Impact Threat is defined as any single or multiple attacks 
conducted against a maritime target, which has the potential to inflict more than 
1,000 casualties; severely impact the economy and intermodal transportation 
system; and create a major psychological impact on the homeland.  There have 
not been any high impact maritime attacks within NORTHCOM’s AOR, nor 
internationally.  The main danger of a high impact attack is the use of a weapon 
of mass destruction or weapon of mass disruption emanating from a ship. 
1. Baltic Sky Incident 
While no high impact maritime attacks have occurred in history, an 
incident encountered by Greece on 22 June, 2003, demonstrates the alarming 
potential for future attacks --- rogue ship.    The Baltic Sky, a relatively small 
(1,170 tons) oil tanker was boarded and seized by Monada Ypovrixion Kastrofon, 
the Greek Special Forces, in the Ionian Sea after receiving reports from Turkish 
authorities that it was acting suspiciously.  The ship departed Istanbul, Turkey on 
02 June with its new captain and loitered off the Greek Isles for three weeks 
instead of proceeding to its next port of call in Sudan.15 
Greek authorities reported that the ship was transporting “a commercially 
manufactured ammonium nitrate-based explosive known as ANFO, which is 
often used in mining and construction.”16  750 tons of the ANFO explosive and 
8,000 detonators were seized.  A police source, in a Guardian report of the 
incident stated “the sheer volume of the explosives involved is mind-boggling. 
One metric tonne is enough to blow apart an entire apartment block; here we're 
talking about 680 tonnes [750 U.S. tons] floating around the Mediterranean."17 
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This is the first reported incident in the war on terror where a vessel has 
been seized with enough explosives aboard to yield the same destructive power 
as a low grade nuclear weapon.  The incident is still under investigation with only 
speculation on the actual intent of the Baltic Sky.  Nevertheless, a vessel with 
750 tons of explosive succeeded in entering a nation’s territorial waters without 
declaring the hazardous cargo.  This incident suggests that loading a vessel with 
explosives and entering territorial waters is possible and seemingly more feasible 
than transporting nuclear weapons which are much more closely scrutinized 
under international non-proliferation treaties and agreements. 
2. Analysis of High Impact Threat 
Al Qaeda reportedly has made the acquisition of WMD capability a priority.  
The most compelling evidence that this is a priority can be found in the February 
7, 2001 testimony of prosecution witness Jamal Ahmad Al-Fadl in United States 
v. Usama Bin Laden et al., defendants.  Al-Fadl testified to his attempted late 
1993 and early 1994 role in helping Bin Laden acquire uranium, most probably 
for the development of nuclear weapons, from a resource in Sudan.18  Al-Fadl’s 
testimony coupled with the trend that attacks against U.S. target sets are 
increasingly more dramatic, suggests that the acquisition of a WMD is a long 
range and possibly attainable goal of Al Qaeda, given sufficient time. 
The case of the Baltic Sky, however demonstrates that terrorists do not 
need nuclear or biological weapons to pose a high-risk threat.  The Baltic Sky 
had enough explosives aboard to yield similar destruction in a port as a low 
grade WMD.  By comparison, the Mother of all Bombs (MOAB) tested just prior 
to Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, was reported to have the following 
bomb damage radius:19 
• Up to 1,000 yards: Obliterates everything. 
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• Up to 1 mile: Knocks people, tents, light buildings, cars and jeeps over 
within 1-mile radius. 
• Up to 1.7 miles: shock wave kills people, causes severe damage to 
buildings, equipment, blows trucks, tanks off road. 
• Up to 2 miles: causes deafness. 
• Up to 5 miles: shakes ground, breaks windows. 
• Up to 30 miles: 10,000 foot high mushroom cloud visible.  
The MOAB carries 18,700 lbs of high explosive.  This equates to roughly about 9 
tons.  It would take 83 MOABs to equal the explosive potential of the cargo 
aboard the Baltic Sky.   
While efforts toward stemming proliferation of weapons overseas are 
prudent, an eye toward vulnerabilities of vessels that could be converted into 
weapons of mass destruction is equally important.  One potential target, if 
thinking asymmetrically, is an attack on a Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) tanker while 
entering port.   
There are four existing LNG terminals in Georgia, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, and Maryland.  There are no LNG terminals on the west coast; 
however, recent reports suggest future plans to build up to 9 additional LNG 
terminals along the east, west, and gulf coasts with LNG imports accounting for 
15% of the U.S. energy market by 2025.20 
The volatility and destructive potential of LNG makes it a perfect fit for 
terrorists who want to both disrupt the economy and orchestrate a dramatic 
attack that will draw in the media.  Demonstrating the volatility of this concern, 
the potential to either capture or in some way exploit the destructive potential of 
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an LNG tanker has been studied and also wargammed in the U.S. subsequent to 
the 9/11 attacks.21   
E. HALIFAX: THE TOWN THAT DIED 
History has recorded how the accidental collision of two ships and the 
subsequent detonation of an explosives ship, the SS Mont Blanc, virtually 
destroyed the town of Halifax, Nova Scotia.  On 06 December 1917, the SS Imo 
and The SS Mont Blanc collided in Halifax Harbor setting off a volatile chain of 
events.    
The SS Mont Blanc, a small French freighter was converted that year into 
an explosives transport for a one-time shipment of explosives with the intended 
destination of Bordeaux during World War I.  The vessel’s manifest indicated that 
she was carrying “2,300 tons of picric acid, 200 tons of TN,T, 35 tons of benzole, 
and ten tons of gun cotton. “22 
Mont Blanc’s slow speed landed made her vulnerable to a U-Boat attack 
so she was ordered to Halifax where she would join a larger and slower convoy 
that could afford her some protection.  While entering port, an ill-fated string of 
events transpired resulting in the Mont Blanc and the Imo Colliding in a 
bottleneck passage in the harbor known as the “narrows.”   
The collision set off a fire, the only missing ingredient for this floating 
bomb, and ignited the largest man-made explosion long before the U.S. strikes 
against Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  The estimates of the aftermath were that the 
explosion killed 1,963, injured 9,000, and blinded 199 people.  Nearly 320 acres 
of the town were leveled and the property loss and cost of repairs were estimated 
at $35 Million.23  
The thesis has classed the threat matrix for the purpose of this study 
based on the potential physical, economic, and psychological impact --- typical 
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terrorist goals when planning an operation.  Based on the patterns of attacks by 
al Qaeda, some precepts can be made: (1) Al Qaeda aims at dramatic attacks 
that will grab media attention, (2) Al Qaeda has an intrinsic ability to think and 
operate outside the box, (3) Al Qaeda learns from its successes and failures and 
tries to apply those lessons to future operations. 
There is a predicament for planners when considering the impact of an 
attack, which must be acknowledged here.  Policy makers, scholars, and defense 
planners argue that the clearest and most present danger against the homeland 
is the detonation of a WMD at or beyond a U.S. port, and therefore consider that 
the most likely high impact threat.  This is not necessarily true. 
A WMD attack in a single port, while devastating and horrific, will not shut 
down the economy, nor have a long-term effect on other ports.  Conversely, a 
threat normally considered low impact such as a small boat attack or mining 
operation could rise to the level of high impact if the attacks were coordinated at 
multiple ports. 
If Al Qaeda is able to think outside the box and think strategically, as this 
thesis and other sources contend, it would make sense that with the mounting 
pressures against proliferation of WMD, attempting a coordinated conventional 
attack against U.S. ports might draw less suspicion in the planning phase.  
NORTHCOM planners could draw some valuable lessons from these incidents in 


























III. STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES CONFRONTING NORTHCOM 
IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN 
A. SECURITY VS DEFENSE IN NORTHCOM'S MARITIME MISSION 
Maritime Homeland Security and Defense are both missions that require a 
team effort.  The stakeholder wheel on both the 2001 and 2003 NPS Maritime 
Homeland Security/ Defense Wargames is testament to the complexities of who 
is or may be involved in securing and defending the homeland.24  While this 
thesis acknowledges that NORTHCOM must coordinate with a slew of federal, 
state, and local agencies, a full analysis of these relationships is beyond the 
scope of this study.  Instead this thesis will focus solely on NORTHCOM’s 
challenges in coordinating with the Coast Guard and the Navy on security/ 
defense missions. 
The conventional wisdom suggests that security of U.S. ports, maritime 
approaches, and critical maritime infrastructure is a Coast Guard lead effort.  The 
Navy is believed to be solely responsible for “blue water” operations and defense 
in the event of an attack on the U.S. and U.S. interests.   However, the research 
in this thesis has found that the structural requirements in the spectrum of 
security and defense are both blurred and mismatched.  The greatest structural 
challenge for NORTHCOM will be in planning which assets are required for its 
potential missions and contingencies and coordinating between the two services. 
Prior to 9/11 the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) 
coordinated air defense of the U.S. while the Joint Forces Command was 
designated to execute land and sea defense.  Peter Verga, the Special Assistant 
[to the Secretary of Defense] for Homeland Security made an excellent parallel 
between what is needed for homeland defense and what is expected from first 
responders. 
when we dial 9-1-1, we do not expect to have to deal with nine 
different law enforcement agencies – we expect to deal with one 
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person who will energize the necessary agencies response. The 
same should be true for dealing with the defense of our nation and 
military support to civilian authorities.25 
The establishment of NORTHCOM is intended to create a unified command 
providing a single command and control authority over sea, air and land defense 
of the United States. This chapter will define the Maritime Homeland Security 
(MHLS) and Maritime Home Land Defense (MHLD) Missions.  NORTHCOM’s 
mission and roles also will be outlined here.     
While competing terms exist for NORTHCOM’s core missions, they 
essentially merge on three core mission postures within the Maritime domain.  
This thesis identifies three core mission areas within the maritime domain where 
NORTHCOM would be called upon to plan for, coordinate, and respond.  These 
missions are: (1) Maritime Homeland Defense, (2) Maritime Homeland Security, 
(3) Civil Support.  
This thesis examines an apparent seam between NORTHCOM’s MHLS 
and MHLD missions that requires further scrutiny.  This seam will be posited and 
studied here. This chapter will also outline the maritime defense chain of 
command to the component level of the Navy and Coast Guard.  
B. NORTHCOM AND THE MARITIME DOMAIN  
The definitions and roles of Maritime Homeland Security and Maritime 
Homeland Defense are moving targets.  As of February 2004, nearly three years 
after Homeland Security and Homeland Defense became catchwords for the 
DOD’s new homeland mission; there is still no official DOD definition of these 
terms cited in the Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Terms.26  Nevertheless, various strategic policies published since 9/11 offer 
some distinction between these terms and are addressed here.  
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1. The U.S. Maritime Domain 
Since there are no current agreed upon definitions of MHLS and MHLD, 
the terms must be tapered from the “big picture” terms of Homeland Security and 
Homeland Defense.  Because these missions are expressly in the maritime 
domain, it is important to understand what encompasses the maritime domain.  
The best definition of Maritime Domain can be found from the U.S. Coast Guard 
which explains the depth of the maritime domain as encompassing all U.S. ports 
and port security, inland waterways, harbors, navigable waters, Great Lakes, 
territorial seas, contiguous waters, customs waters, coastal seas, littoral areas, 
the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone, and oceanic regions of U.S. national interest, 
as well as the sea lanes to the United States, U.S. maritime approaches, and the 
high seas surrounding America.27 
Both Coast Guard and Naval forces routinely patrol the Maritime Domain.  
Therefore, it is important to identify the roles and associated missions within the 
Maritime Domain and understand which agency is the lead for executing MHLD 
and MHLS.  The maritime threat, mission, and capabilities drive who is the Lead 
Federal Agency (LFA), as opposed to the maritime boundaries.     
2. Maritime Homeland Security 
Homeland Security, as defined in the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security is “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the 
United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the 
damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”28  The key words in this 
definition are (1) prevent attacks, (2) reduce vulnerability, (3) minimize damage, 
and (4) recovery.   
As we are a maritime nation, our economy remains dependent on reliable, 
safe maritime related commerce.  This dependence is increasingly important in 
the globalizing world economy.  Avoiding or minimizing disruptions remains key. 
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Maritime Homeland Security, therefore, is a concerted national effort to 
prevent terrorist attacks within the United States Maritime Domain, and minimize 
or reduce vulnerability to ports and critical maritime infrastructure, to avoid any 
damage or disruption and quickly recover from any attacks that do occur.  
3. Maritime Homeland Defense 
Absent “official” agreement on terms, the working definition of Homeland 
Defense as viewed by the Department of Defense is  
the military protection of United States territory, domestic 
population, and critical defense infrastructure against external 
threats and aggression.  It also includes routine, steady state 
activities designed to deter aggressors and to prepare U.S. military 
forces for action if deterrence fails.29 
Maritime Homeland Defense or National Maritime Defense, as phrased by 
NORTHCOM is “All measures of Homeland Defense taken to deter, defeat, or 
nullify hostile maritime threats against U.S. territory, domestic population and 
critical infrastructure.”30 It is important to note that while the focus of this study 
thus far has been from the perspective of MHLD against a non-state threat (i.e. 
terrorist threat); MHLD also encompasses planning against a direct attack on the 
U.S. by a rogue or hostile sovereign nation.  
4. The Maritime Homeland Security and Defense Seam 
While the terms MHLS and MHLD and their distinct missions continue to 
solidify, there remains a transitive seam between these two missions.  One way 
to better understand this “seam” is by considering the spectrum of threats to the 
homeland.  NORTHCOM calls it “the ‘seam’ between war and crime.”31  The 
premise behind this “spectrum” is simply that at one end of the spectrum there 
are threats that are clearly military operations against the U.S.  An example of 
this is the Soviet ballistic missile submarine patrols conducted against the U.S. 
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during the Cold War  --- deterrence, mitigation, and response are unmistakably 
Homeland Defense and thus DOD lead missions. 
At the other end of the spectrum is the crime threat, which is unmistakably 
a law enforcement-related threat.  Examples of this include the flood of illegal 
immigration at our land borders with Mexico and maritime borders with Cuba and 
Haiti.  These are clearly classified as Homeland Security threats and primarily 
law enforcement, specifically U. S. Customs and U.S. Coast Guard, missions. 
Threats operating within this seam range from trans-national terrorists like 
Al Qaeda to domestic terrorists like Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols. The 
seam between “war and crime” is the challenge within this spectrum that will 
require advanced interagency coordination and “outside the box” thinking 
towards the possible threats that could try to exploit this seam.  Who has both the 
responsibility and authority to handle “seam” threats? 
One example of threats in the “seam” is the scenario of a WMD entering 
the U.S. via container ship.  Suppose there is actionable intelligence that the 
suspect vessel is approaching the U.S. with hostile intent.   If that vessel were 
not demonstrating hostile intent, would DOD forces be limited by their Rules of 
Engagement in international waters --- even if they were first to arrive on the 
scene?  Department of Defense, Coast Guard and or U.S. Customs coordination 
to effectively interdict and obtain timely changes in ROE from the Combatant 
Commander’s needs to be considered in advance, potentially through further war 
gaming. 
If hostile forces can perceive a seam in the responsibilities, authority, or a 
capability mismatch, how might this manifest itself?  Could strategically targeting 
the maritime-based U.S. economy reveal pressure points within this seam that 
could be exploited?  This remains an area for further high priority inter-agency 
research and coordination. 
C. DEFENSE VS SECURITY IN NORTHCOM’ S MARITIME MISSION 
NORTHCOM apparently distinguishes itself as a command exclusively 




Joint Operating Concept white paper published on 12 December 2003 identifies 
three Mission areas where NORTHCOM’s key responsibilities and mission 
priorities reside: (1) Homeland Defense, (2) Civil Support, and (3) Emergency 
Preparedness.32  These three mission areas and subsequent mission sets as 
related to the Maritime Domain are explained below. 
1. Maritime Homeland Defense: Extraordinary Circumstances 
The first key mission area identified by NORTHCOM is Maritime 
Homeland Defense.  This mission area is considered an extraordinary 
circumstance whereby the Department of Defense: 
would be required to execute its traditional military missions in 
defense of the people and territory of our country.  In these 
instances, DOD is supported by other federal agencies. Plans for 
such contingencies, to the extent possible, would be coordinated, 
as appropriate, with the National Security Council and with the 
Homeland Security Council.33 
Maritime Homeland Defense is the primary mission area wherein NORTHCOM, 
under standing orders from the Secretary of Defense and the President, will likely 
assume the role as Lead Federal Agency (LFA) and will be supported by other 
federal and state agencies.  Maritime mission sets that fall into this category 
include, but are not limited to maritime interdiction, mine warfare, air defense, 
undersea warfare, and special warfare. 
One example of this type of mission is Operation Noble Eagle.  As an 
immediate response to the 2001 September 11 attacks, an unprecedented sortie 
of carrier battle groups on the East and West Coast took place to protect the 
coastlines and approaches and monitor the skies against a potential second 
wave of attacks, while Navy E-2 Hawkeyes provided expanded air and surface 
surveillance coverage of both coasts. 
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2. Civil Support 
The second key mission area identified by NORTHCOM is Civil Support.  
Under NORTHCOM, Civil Support may be directed “to provide the means to 
assist civilian authorities in order to save lives, protect property and public health 
and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe.”34  DOD and 
NORTHCOM would act in a supporting role of civilian authorities. 
Under this mission area, maritime mission sets may include, but are not 
limited to Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) and Military Assistance 
for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA).  The Homeland Security Joint 
Operating Concept, however, makes clear that Civil Support Missions by title 10 
forces will only be undertaken when “its involvement is appropriate and when a 
clear end state for the Department’s role is defined.”35 
Some examples of these operations in the maritime domain include the 12 
September 2001 deployment of the hospital ship USNS Comfort to New York 
Harbor for Civil Support.  Comfort reached New York three days after the World 
Trade Center attacks with orders to provide support services to New York 
emergency personnel and serve as a rest center for thousands of disaster relief 
workers.36 
Other examples of Civil Support mission sets include ongoing U.S. Navy 
involvement in counter-drug operations in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard 
and U.S. Customs, Maritime Homeland Security patrols by Navy and Coast 
Guard crews aboard U.S. Navy Cyclone class patrol craft, and the continuing 
development of the Joint Harbor Operations Centers (JHOC) in Norfolk and San 
Diego. 
 
                                            
34United States Department of Defense, Department of Defense Homeland Security Joint 
Operating Concept (draft), (12 December 2003 [cited on 12 January 2004]); available from the World 
Wide Web @  , http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/drafthls_joc.doc, Pg. 15 
35Ibid, Pg 15 
36Military Sealift Command Public Affairs,  “USNS Comfort Providing Comfort In New York,”  [on-





3. Emergency Preparedness 
The third key mission area identified by NORTHCOM is Emergency 
Preparedness.  This mission area is planned to “ensure DOD processes, 
procedures, and resources are in place to support the President and Secretary of 
Defense in a designated National Security Emergency.”37  Under this mission 
area, maritime mission sets may include Continuity of Operations (COOP) 
missions. 
COOP, delineated under Presidential Decision Directive, “requires federal 
agencies to develop COOP plans for essential operations. These COOP plans 
were viewed as a unifying concept not to replace existing plans but, instead, to 
be superimposed if and when a problem threatens a serious disruption of agency 
operations.”38 
One mission essential naval component for NORTHCOM in this mission 
area may be the utilization of two existing Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadrons, 
VQ-2 and VQ-3 stationed at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma.   These Navy 
squadrons fly the E-6B communications relay and strategic airborne command 
post aircraft that provide “survivable, reliable, and endurable airborne command, 
control, and communications between the National Command Authority (NCA) 
and U.S. strategic and non-strategic forces.”39 
VQ-2 and VQ-3 have been under operational control (OPCON) of the US 
Strategic Command (STRATCOM) since 1993 while reporting to the U.S. Navy’s 
Patrol Wings Pacific for administrative purposes.40  Because this platform is 
capable of dual missions as “strategic relay” and “airborne command center,” 
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should the squadrons remain under OPCON of STRATCOM?  Under what 
circumstance or arrangement might OPCON shift to NORTHCOM? 
D. THE MARITIME DEFENSE CHAIN OF COMMAND 
Because the U.S. enjoyed an ocean buffer zone between itself and hostile 
nations, little attention has been paid in the past to maritime defense except in 
times of war when aggressors threatened U.S. waters and the maritime trade.41 
NORTHCOM’s Commander also wears a “dual hatted” Combatant Commander 
(COCOM) role commanding North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), a 
bi-national (United States and Canada) organization that since 1957 has 
provided surveillance and control of the U.S. and Canadian Airspace to validate 
and warn of an imminent air attack.   In a testimony before Congress immediately 
after 9/11, General Ralph E. Eberhart, then Commander In Chief North American 
Aerospace Defense Command stated that NORAD’s aerospace control and air 
defense missions have: 
traditionally been oriented to detect and identify all aircraft entering 
North American airspace, and if necessary, intercept potentially 
threatening inbound air traffic. . . Based on the recent events, we 
are now also focused on threats originating within domestic 
airspace such as hijacked aircraft.  While we have adjusted to 
provide a rapid response to domestic air threats, we continue to 
execute our previously assigned missions.42 
NORAD has been an established command for forty-six years.  While it 
may take another 9/11-style attack to validate how NORAD remains relevant to 
homeland defense, NORAD has an existing and proven intelligence, space, and 
air command architecture in place to support air defense of the U.S.  There is no 
maritime equivalent to NORAD.   
Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, has echoed this same 
sentiment in several public statements since 9/11 including his remarks at the 
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Naval-Industry R&D Partnership Conference in Washington, D.C. on August 15, 
2002 where he said  
I'm convinced we need a NORAD for maritime forces. The effect of 
these operations will extend the security of the United States far 
seaward, taking advantage of the time and space purchased by 
forward deployed assets to protect the U.S. from impending 
threats.43 
   The purpose of this section is to evaluate the maritime defense chain of 
command and ask the question: Do we need a maritime NORAD?     
1. Maritime Defense Zones 
The nearest facsimile of NORAD were the Maritime Defense Zones 
(MARDEZ) and Naval Coastal Warfare.  Established on March 7, 1984 through a 
Memorandum of Agreement between the Secretary of Transportation and the 
Secretary of the Navy, MARDEZ (MDZ) remained the standing chain of 
command for Maritime Homeland Defense prior to 9/11.  
MARDEZ split the Continental U.S into two jointly staffed “3-star” 
commands and zones: Atlantic and Pacific.  These commands were third- 
echelon Navy commands that reported to their respective Fleet Commanders but 
were under the command of the Coast Guard.44  The intended role for the MDZ 
was to: 
Provide an integrated Navy-Coast Guard approach to waterborne 
port defense and protection of critical infrastructure, high value sea 
lift assets and naval units . . . MDZ focuses on the vulnerable end-
nodes of the sea lines of communication: the seaports of 
embarkation and debarkation.45 
The MDZ was created to counter the Soviet threat against critical port 
infrastructure and sea lines of communication (SLOC).  There is no record of the  
MDZ ever having been activated; it has only functioned in its secondary role of 
executing contingency operations primarily by deploying Naval Coastal Warfare 
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units (NCW) or Coast Guard Port Security Units (PSU) in support of operations 
outside of the Continental U.S.  These include: 
• NCW deployments to Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti). 
• NCW deployments to Operation Maintain Democracy (Haiti). 
• PSU and NCW deployments for force protection of units training at 
Vieques Island, PR.   (during civil protests against the training)  
• NCW deployments during Operation Desert Storm. 
• NCW deployments to Operation Enduring Freedom.  
The only known operations of MDZ units within the Continental U.S. are: 
(1) a 1998 PSU deployment to Seattle Washington, to provide waterborne 
security for the President and other World Trade Organization leaders during the 
WTO Summit; and (2) Initial deployments of NCW and PSU to New York harbor, 
the Potomac River, and other potentially vulnerable ports in the opening moves 
of Operation Noble Eagle in the immediate post-9/11/01 timeframe.46   
While the MDZ structure for MHLD has not been officially abandoned, the 
change in maritime threats from conventional to asymmetric, as well as the use 
of MDZ assets for “away vs. home games” makes the concept appear dead in 
the water.  It is significant to note that on September 11, 2001, during a time of 
extreme perceived vulnerability to the U.S. homeland, the MDZ construct was not 
activated. 
2. Current MHLS/ MHLD Chain of Command  
With its establishment, NORTHCOM is responsible for conducting MHLD 
and supporting MHLS.  NORTHCOM’s command structure distributes military 
responsibility among three component commanders: Joint Forces Air Component 
Commander (JFACC), Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC), and 
Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC). 
As stated in Chapter I, NORTHCOM has no permanently assigned 
maritime forces, only a skeleton staff for intelligence and planning.  In contrast to 
the other area unified commands, which have naval forces “chopped” in their 
respective theaters regularly, this lack of any assigned naval forces makes                                             




NORTHCOM appear like a paper tiger.  However, in the context of history, this 
deficit in assigned forces should not be a surprise.  When Central Command was 
established in on 1 January 1983, like NORTHCOM, it also had no permanently 
assigned forces.  Operational forces go where they are needed most.   
 NORTHCOM’s JFMCC is U.S. Naval Forces Northern Command 
(NAVNORTH).  NAVNORTH, located in Norfolk, Va., is a multi-tasked command.  
The NAVNORTH staff is triple-hatted as also Commander Atlantic Fleet (CLF) 
and Commander Fleet Forces Command (CFFC).  Component commands under 
this structure are then sub-divided between the east and west coast fleet 
concentration areas.   
The east coast component is designated as NAVNORTH Fleet East 
(NAVNORTHFLT-E), in Norfolk, VA, and is administratively assigned as 
Commander Second Fleet (C2F) under CLF until assigned to NAVNORTH for 
HLD missions.  Similarly, the west coast component is NAVNORTH Fleet West 
(NAVNORTHFLT-W), in San Diego, CA. and is administratively assigned as 
Commander Third Fleet (C3F).  
While Coast Guard forces may be assigned to the JFMCC for MHLD 
missions, according to the Unified Command Plan, they are normally under their 
own command structure of regional commanders for MHLS.  Unlike Navy 
Commands, the hierarchy for MHLS missions begins with Commandant U.S. 
Coast Guard, who is under civilian control of the Department of Homeland 
Security.  Like the Navy, the subordinate commands are divided between east 
coast and west coast commands.  USCG Atlantic Area (LANTAREA), located in 
Portsmouth, VA, is responsible for operations on the U.S. east coast and the Gulf 
of Mexico.  Commander USCG Pacific Area (PACAREA), located in Alameda, 
CA, directs USCG operations on the west coast of the US, Alaska, Hawaii, and 
the Pacific Rim. 
Unlike the Navy, subcomponents of this command structure are further 
divided into USCG Districts responsible not only for harbors and coastal 




are Districts 1, 5, 7, 8, and 9.  Under PACAREA command are Districts 11, 13, 
14, and 17.  Within the Coast Guard, for specific ports, each Captain of the Port 
has unique and overriding authority to control security and other aspects of port 





































































IV. COMPETING MISSION PRIORITIES AND SERVICE 
CULTURE CHALLENGES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One of the greatest challenges for NORTHCOM will be how to mesh and 
coordinate the two main maritime defense/ security components within its 
structure.  In September of 1998, then Chief of Naval Operations Jay Johnson 
and Coast Guard Commandant Admiral James Loy signed the National Fleet 
Policy Statement.  The joint agreement was intended “to ensure that as the 
Coast Guard and Navy move to recapitalize their forces in the 21st century, they 
synchronize planning, training, and procurement to provide the highest level of 
maritime capability for the nation’s investment.”47 
Maritime strategy, force structure, and policy changes may take months or 
years to implement.  The measurement of change, however, is tangible.  In the 
maritime domain, it can be measured by changes in mission priorities, funding for 
certain programs, or joint cooperation in projects, exercises, and operations. 
Another challenge to effecting a cohesive maritime security/ defense force 
is overcoming obstacles from service culture.  Service culture is defined as “a 
system of shared values that define what is important and norms that define 
appropriate attitudes and behaviors for organizational members telling them how 
to feel and behave.”48  This system of values and norms may evolve from 
historical experience, missions, and indoctrination.  Service culture is embedded 
throughout the past, present, and future mission priorities.  It will take much 
longer to align service culture to implement maritime security/ defense. 
This thesis has found that the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard only 
comprise a “notional” national fleet.  While there is joint cooperation between the 
Navy and Coast Guard, competing mission priorities and service cultures remain 
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at odds with forming a cohesive force for MHLD and MHLS.  This chapter will 
look at both the mission priorities and cultural challenges to achieving a more 
cooperative, holistic maritime force posture.  
B. U.S. COAST GUARD MISSION PRIORITIES BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11      
Of the two maritime services, the Coast Guard has seen the most 
dramatic shift in demand for MHLD/MHLD missions.  While maritime security and 
defense has been among its core mission sets before 9/11, an unconceivable 
attack on the U.S. homeland measured low on the priority scale compared to the 
many other routine, but critical Coast Guard mission sets.   
Post 9/11 maritime strategies have swung the pendulum to the other 
direction.  Some observers believe that the pendulum has swung too far and that 
now the Coast Guard is neglecting some of its core competencies.       
1. U.S. Coast Guard Mission Priorities Before 9/11 
The Coast Guard is the only U.S. armed service with law enforcement 
authority.  While maritime security has always been a coast guard mission, the 
service’s strategic priorities were principally focused on interdicting illegal 
migration, enforcing maritime safety, maritime environmental protection, 
navigation aid maintenance, performing rescue operations, and drug 
enforcement.   
On March 25th, 1999 President Clinton signed Executive Order 13115 
establishing the Interagency Task Force on Coast Guard Roles and Missions.  
The task force consisted of sixteen senior Administration members who 
undertook this effort to identify and prioritize current and future Coast Guard 
roles, missions, and functions.  The task force studied and recommended which 
missions should be added, maintained, reduced, or eliminated.49  The effort 
consisted of research, field trips, review of stakeholder interviews, and debate. 
The results appear in the task force’s report, signed on December 3rd, 1999. 
Because the last Coast Guard study of this scope was completed in 1982, 
this nine-month study recommended major course changes for a long-term                                             
49“Task Force Established on Coast Guard Roles and Missions,” [on-line] (16 April 1999 [cited on 




strategic vision through 2020.  The findings from this task force give a snapshot 
of the Coast Guard’s pre-9/11 mission priorities.  Critical missions which were 
reported to be Coast Guard priorities for a range of motives included:50 
• Maritime Security 
• Alien Migrant Interdiction Operation 
• Drug Interdiction National Defense 
• Protection of Natural Resources 
• Living Marine Resources 
• Marine Environmental Protection 
• Maritime Safety 
This report found that the two mission areas considered most important to 
national security by the Coast Guard, and the missions that drew the most 
resources were Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations and Drug Interdiction 
National Defense.  Both mission sets have consumed the bulk of Coast Guard 
operational assets within the past five years preceding the task force study. 
a. Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations  
The Coast Guard has experienced a surge in Alien Migrant 
Interdiction Operations since the 1980 mass migration from Cuba, known as the 
Mariel Boat Lift.   Since the Mariel Boat Lift 
migrant interdiction has become a substantial Coast Guard mission 
that has, over the past five years, required about 5% percent of the 
Coast Guard’s operating budget, or about $160 million per year, 
excluding mass migration response years.51 
Through 2001, there have been three instances in the past 20 
years where instability in Cuba and Haiti has threatened a mass exodus.  
Because the Coast Guard is the lead federal agency in maritime interdiction of 
alien migration under the “Mass Immigration Emergency Plan,” it has had to 
maintain a surge capability for air, land, and sea elements and has diverted its 
assets during periods of unrest in the Caribbean. 
                                            
50 Interagency Task Force on Coast Guard Roles and Missions, Coast Guard of the 21st Century, 
[on-line] (December 1999 [cited on 6 January 2004]); available from the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.uscg.mil, Chapter 2 




Additionally, the Coast Guard has been involved in interdicting what 
it calls Routine Illegal Migration “usually [involving] relatively small numbers of 
migrants (1-200 per trip). These routine migration attempts have resulted in an 
average of nearly 5,000 interdictions per year.” 52 This demand has not abated 
since 9/11. 
b. Drug Interdiction 
The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for maritime drug 
interdiction.  As the lead agency, its mission is to stem the flow of drugs into the 
U.S. by denying smugglers use of the air and maritime approaches, including the 
Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico and Pacific approaches.  Nearly 52% of all 
government drug seizures are performed by the Coast Guard.53   
In the period between 1994 and 2001, the Coast Guard 
progressively increased their number of arrests and seizures of Cocaine, 
Marijuana, and Heroin by approximately 20% annually.54  In their report, the 
roles and missions task force admits that it is nearly impossible to predict the 
increase or decrease in supply or demand.  Therefore, they conclude 
It will be important to maintain an effective deterrent to maritime 
smuggling. Future interdiction requirements should be developed 
taking into account two critical aspects: the importance of sufficient 
flexibility in existing forces to take the offensive (in responding to 
intelligence cueing of both operational and strategic variety) and to 
establish sufficient deterrent presence independent of ebbs and 
flows of contraband to deny the use of maritime smuggling 
routes.55 
 
Until 9/11 drug smuggling was viewed as a clear and present danger to national 
security and a top priority for Coast Guard asset and funding allocation.     
                                             
52 Ibid. Ch 2. 
53 United States Coast Guard, “Drug Interdiction,” [on-line] (February 2004 [cited on 22 February 
2004]); available from the World Wide Web @ http://www.uscg.mil 
54United States Coast Guard, “Drug Seizure Statistics for 1994-2002,” [on-line] (January 2003 
[cited on 20 February 2004]); available from the World Wide Web @ http://www.uscg.mil 
55 Interagency Task Force on Coast Guard Roles and Missions,Coast Guard of the 21st Century 





2. U.S. Coast Guard Mission Priorities After 9/11  
Maritime Homeland security, until September 11, 2001 was understood as 
being a mission priority.  In their report, the missions and roles task force 
acknowledged that in the decades ahead, transnational terrorist threats of 
asymmetric warfare might be directed against the U.S.   However, concerns over 
an aging Coast Guard fleet, high op-tempo with limited resources, and other daily 
national security mission priorities took precedence over MHLS. 
9/11 events have swung the operational pendulum in the other direction.  
Beginning on September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard has made MHLS its top 
mission.  On that morning, Coast Guard air and sea assets were diverted from 
operating areas in the Caribbean, North Atlantic, and Eastern Pacific to bolster 
protection of coastal areas, critical ports, and inland waterways from a potential 
follow-on maritime attack.  Naval security zones were established to protect 
critical infrastructure and Navy ships. 
In fact, before 9/11, the Coast Guard committed less than 2 percent of its 
operations on maritime security.  Immediately after 9/11, 50 to 60 percent of time 
and resources was spent on protecting U.S. ports.56  Other actions taken since 
September 11, 2001 included:57 
• Activation and assignment of 4 of its 6 Port Security Units (PSUs) 
to protect the ports of New York, Boston, Seattle, and Los 
Angeles/Long Beach.  
• Boarding and inspecting suspect inbound vessels.  
• Escorting cruise ships into and out of port. 
• Escorting oil tankers into and out of Valdez, Alaska.  
• Instituting new regulations requiring inbound ships to provide 96-
hour advance notice of arrival. 
• Deployment of Sea Marshals for inbound/ outbound commercial 
transits.  
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As the case studies in chapter five will show, the Coast Guard is unable to 
sustain the intensity of these maritime security operations.  The same sources 
cited in the previous subsection on mission priorities before 9/11 will show that 
there was a sharp drop in both drug and illegal migrant interdiction for the period 
of 2001-2002.  As of February, 2004 a sustainable balance between maritime 
security and other missions has not been achieved.  Notably, however, the 
“other” threats to national security have not yet abated.   
A near-crisis in Haiti from late February 2004, averted only because the 
former president Jean Bertrand Aristide fled the country, nearly triggered another 
mass exodus from the island.  This exodus was already beginning to show itself 
to the Coast Guard.  Within four days, the Coast Guard intercepted 546 Haitians 
50 miles off the coast of Haiti, totaling 694 Haitians for the month of February.58  
While this is not considered an exodus, assets have been diverted away from the 
MHLS mission to respond to this crisis.  Balancing traditional vs. MHLS priorities 
will be a continuing challenge for the Coast Guard. 
C. U.S. NAVY MISSION PRIORITIES BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11 
To understand the possible MHLS/ MHLD structural challenges for 
NORTHCOM, a good starting point is to examine the differences in mission 
priorities for the Navy before and after 9/11.  While the strategic vision changed 
between the post-Cold War peace dividend era and the new era of a Global War 
on terror ushered in by 9/11, it is important to understand that the Navy’s force 
structure and service culture is changing at a much slower pace. 
For this thesis, one good measure for understanding the structural 
challenges facing NORTHCOM is to take a snapshot of U.S. Navy strategy and 
vision from 1989 (the end of the Cold War) to just before the October 2000 USS 
Cole incident.  This period contrasts well against the current vision in a post-
Cole, post-9/11 world. 
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1. U.S. Navy Roles and Mission Priorities, 1989-2001 
At the draw down of the Cold War, marked by the rapid disintegration of 
the Soviet Union, the missions and priorities of the U.S. Navy were somewhat 
mismatched with its Cold War era capabilities.  The Navy’s roles and mission 
priorities during this period are documented in the three published operational 
concepts during the 1990’s.  The first was From the Sea in 1992, followed by 
Forward . . . From the Sea in 1994, and finally Forward from the Sea, The  
Operational Concept  in 1997.  The apogee of these strategies is a focus on 
“away” games.   
The Cold War strategy of “blue water” and chokepoint operations against 
an equally powerful aggressor in order to keep the sea lines of communication 
open was overhauled in 1992 with . . .From the Sea.  This white paper shifted the 
strategic vision of the Navy from open ocean operations to a Navy and Marine 
Corps strategy of expeditionary power projection further away from the U.S. 
homeland and into the distant littorals in response to overseas regional 
challenges.   The strategic mission priorities stressed in this paper are:59 
• Strategic deterrence and defense 
• Forward presence 
• Crisis response 
• Reconstitution 
• Command, Control 
• Surveillance 
• Battlespace Dominance;  
• Power Projection 
• Force Sustainment. 
In 1994, Forward…From the Sea supported the same mission priorities in 
as the preceeding strategic paper.  Because the nation was enjoying a post-Cold 
War and post-Desert Storm peace dividend, the purpose of the paper was to 
make the Navy still appear relevant.  
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Because we are a maritime nation, our security strategy is 
necessarily a transoceanic one.  Our vital interests—those interests 
for which the United States is willing to fight-- are at the endpoint of 
"highways of the seas" or lines of strategic approach that stretch 
from the United States to the farthest point on the globe. 60   
  
The theme was an emphasis on peace time operations or Military Operations 
Other Than War (MOOTW).  This strategy also placed an emphasis on “away” 
games, except closer to foreign shores and further from ours.  For example, one 
of the missions showcased in this paper was the ability of forward-deployed 
naval forces to contribute to humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief.   
Successful relief efforts in the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Rwanda are cited as 
examples.  Interestingly, in 1994 there were thirty-six declarations of major 
disasters in the U.S. reported by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (5 
were along U.S. coasts).61  There was no mention of assistance or ability to 
assist in these “home” scenarios --- the focus continues on “away” games. 
Published in 1997, Forward . . .From the Sea, The Navy Operational 
Concept validates and re-affirms the priorities set in Forward . . . From the Sea.  
The message put forth was instead an allignment with the 1996 CJCS Joint 
Vision 2010 and its concepts.  The emphasis was on examining existing 
operational concepts, doctrine, force organization, and possibilities for innovation 
in future systems and platforms to meet the Navy’s forward deployed, forward 
engaged vision.62  
 
2. U.S. Navy Roles and Mission Priorities 2001- Present 
Sea Power 21 marks a post 9/11 strategy that combines the blue water 
war-at-sea strategy of the 1980’s with the forward deployed, forward engaged, 
littoral strategy of the 1990’s into “a broadened strategy in which naval forces are 
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fully integrated into global joint operations against regional and transnational 
dangers.”63  This strategy establishes three elemental pillars of naval capabilities: 
(1) Sea Strike, (2) Sea Shield, (3) Sea Basing. 
 
Sea Strike is the ability to project precise and persistent 
offensive power from the sea; Sea Shield extends defensive 
assurance throughout the world; and Sea Basing enhances 
operational independence and support for the joint force. 
These concepts build upon the solid foundation of the Navy-
Marine Corps team, leverage U.S. asymmetric advantages, 
and strengthen joint combat effectiveness.64 
 
These capabilities are supported by innovative administrative, training, 
and logistics concepts known as Sea Trial, Sea Warrior, and Sea Enterprise.  
Finally, the Force-Net concept incorporates all the “Sea” elements into an 
integrated force making “network-centric” warfare a reality.65  While the primary 
focus in this strategy is on how to better fight “away” games and also defend the 
force, there is some mounting attention being given to getting prepared to play 
“home” games. 
a. Traditional Focus on “Away” Games 
Naval strategy remains focused on deterring forward in peacetime, 
responding to crises, and fighting and winning the nation’s wars away from the 
homeland.  A corner-stone of this strategy is the newly developed Fleet 
Response Plan instituted in December 2003. 
Under the Fleet Response Plan, ships returning from deployment 
immediately begin their maintenance and re-fit cycle.  After the maintenance 
cycle, ships are then progressively classified as “emergency surge capable,” then 
“surge ready” until six months before their next scheduled deployment, when 
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they are classified “routine deployable.”66  Through this initiative, six Carrier 
Strike Groups could surge forward within thirty days, followed by two more if 
necessary.    
b.  New Post-9/11 Focus on “Home” Games 
Before 9/11 the Navy was already beginning to prepare in a limited 
scope for “home” games.  With the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, the Navy realized 
that the vulnerabilities to its surface combatants existed not only in foreign ports, 
but in U.S. ports as well.   
Naval station and battle group commanders implemented random 
security measures, demanded a heightened posture of Anti-Terrorism/ Force 
Protection, and performed numerous exercises to prepare units for this potential 
threat both at home and abroad.  Navy leaders also liaised with their Coast 
Guard counterparts for inbound/ outbound transit escorts of surface ships, 
aircraft carriers, and submarines within the inland waterways.  The focus of these 
measures, however, was limited to protecting military or “hard” targets.  “Soft” 
targets such as critical infrastructure, ports of embarkation/ debarkation, and the 
civilian merchant industry remained largely unconsidered and unprotected. 
While the thrust of Navy operations remains forward presence, 
forward dominance, “away” games some focus has been placed on maritime 
defense since 9/11 beyond just force protection.  On 5 November 2001, under a 
joint agreement between the Coast Guard and the Navy, four Cyclone-Class 
Navy Patrol Coastal (PC) ships were transferred to OPCON of the Coast Guard 
on the Atlantic Coast and two PCs were later assigned to the Coast Guard on the 
Pacific Coast.  The ships continue to operate in support of our OPERATION 
NOBLE EAGLE, assisting the Coast Guard in MHLS.67 
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Since 2001, the Navy has been collaborating with the Coast Guard 
on the Joint Harbor Operations Center (JHOC) concept.  The first JHOC, 
established in Norfolk during 2002, followed by one in San Diego in 2003, are 
staffed by both Navy and Coast Guard personnel and serve as 24/7 command 
and control centers for maritime awareness and security in those ports.  
Equipped with radar, surveillance cameras, and other sensors JHOCs have the 
ability to monitor the various approaches to the Chesapeake and San Diego 
Bays --- extending their range up to 12 nautical miles from the harbor entrance.  
These advances are pointing toward a potential synergy in creating a Maritime 
NORAD, but only if the MHLS patrols and JHOCs are extended beyond the 
scope of protecting fleet concentration areas.  Resource constraints and service 
culture vie for top honors as the number one obstacle to achieving more effective 
MHLS/ MHLD capabilities throughout our extensive coastline, harbors, and 






















































V. TESTING THE MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY/DEFENSE 
REGIME 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The current maritime construct for MHLS/ MHLD remains untested.  
Although a wargame is not the same as a real crisis, there are still some 
considerably valuable insights that can be drawn from experimenting with the 
unthinkable.  This chapter examines two recent wargame case studies in MHLS/ 
MHLD that can provide some insights into the challenges facing NORTHCOM. 
The November 2001 Maritime Homeland Security Wargame, held at NPS 
in Monterey, was the first major maritime wargame since 9/11 engaging Navy 
and Coast Guard staffs as well as federal, state, local, and private industry 
stakeholders.  The April 2003 Maritime Homeland Security/ Defense Wargame, 
also held at NPS, was the first major maritime wargame conducted since the 
establishment of NORTHCOM.   
Between these two wargames, valuable lessons have been documented 
to help deal with potential asymmetric seaborne attacks including worst-case 
scenarios.  This chapter will examine these cases and present them within the 
context of the current maritime chain of command/ authority under NORTHCOM 
as a test against the original thesis question. 
1. Why a Wargame as a Case Study? 
Wargaming is a decision tool for military staffs.  Through wargaming in a 
virtual environment, participants are able to challenge current norms of doing 
business, test new ideas and strategies, and share different perspectives on how 
to respond to multifarious scenarios.  Wargame results are not predictive.  While 
inputs may be and usually are deterministic, due to player composition and 
decision timing, any wargame output is stochastic.  Iteration, however, may point 
to trends.     
The MHLS/ MHLD wargames studied in this chapter tested operational 




limits to the maritime defense architecture not previously considered.  As a 
consequence of these wargames, new and ground breaking approaches surface 
for solving the challenges ahead which inevitably emerge from an integrated 
perspective of the participants and the civil/ warfare communities they represent. 
B. 2001 NPS MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY WARGAME 
The three-day Maritime Homeland Security Wargame, sponsored by 
Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) and Commander Coast Guard 
Pacific Area (PACAREA) took place on November 7-9, 2001 at the Naval Post 
Graduate School (NPS) in Monterey, Ca.  While the wargame had been planned 
months before September 11, 2001, the game took on greater relevance less 
than two months after the 9/11 attacks.   
One hundred-twenty senior officers and leaders representing federal and 
state level stakeholders, as well as private industry were assembled to 
“challenge assumptions and test operational limits”68 in responding to a 
coordinated asymmetric terrorist attack against strategically vital ports along the 
U.S. Pacific Coast.  
 1. Game Objectives and Scenario/ Move Overview 
The game opens from a USCG state of “new normalcy” of elevated 
security, what is now known as (Yellow) Elevated Condition under the current 
Department of Homeland Security Advisory System.  The game is set during the 
opening moves of a West Coast multi-port U.S. military loadout to support a U.S. 
campaign in the Middle East (adversary was intentionally indistinct). The 
campaign is in response to the 9/11 attacks and a “notional Anthrax attack that 
killed over 1,000 Americans in major population concentrations.  The ports of 
focus were the strategic ports of Los Angeles/ Long Beach, San Francisco, 
Oakland, Concord, and Puget Sound ports, including Indian Island. 
The game’s battle rhythm consisted of five “moves” with each “move” 
representing a week’s time, and was set in real time (November-December 
2001).  At the end of each move, the stakeholder teams gathered for plenary 
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sessions to discuss actions taken during the moves and to brief the next move.  
The main objectives of the game were:69 
• Establish the major Maritime Homeland Security operational 
requirements in the new threat environment. 
• Identify who are the major stakeholders, determine their roles, and 
resolve what tasks must be integrated for operational success. 
• Consider emerging policy and operational requirements. 
While not an explicit objective of the game, one other question relevant to 
this thesis is: Can the U.S. (and the new NORTHCOM) defend against a 
coordinated asymmetric attack (home game) while effecting a Major Theater War 
(away game)?  Below is a summary of the moves within the game, including the 
critical events and responses. 
In the opening move (7-13 November 2001) the U.S. is coping with an 
Anthrax outbreak which was traced by F.B.I and other intelligence agencies to an 
unnamed Middle East Country.  The same country believed responsible for the 
Anthrax outbreak is now “saber rattling” against an “oil rich” neighbor and U.S. 
ally.  The President and Congress respond by authorizing the mobilization of a 
major troop deployment via West Coast ports of embarkation/ debarkation into 
the Middle East Theater. 
The first significant event is the report that the container ship Maersk 
Katarina catches fire off the coast of Long Beach (event 1).70  A follow-on 
intelligence request by Command (PACAREA) is expanded upon by revealing 
that three other containers from the same shipper in Pusan have caught fire in 
Tacoma, Washington (event 5).  In response to another intelligence request, the 
game scenario reveals that the Hyundai Pioneer delivered the three containers, 
and is now underway for Long Beach.  An intelligence inject reports suspicious 
activity by men of Middle Eastern origin seen videotaping the arrival of the 
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Catalina ferry.  While the move was intended as a scene setter for later follow on 
events, the stakeholders took the following key actions during this move: 
• USCG District 13 (Washington) orders Captain of the Port (COTP) 
Puget Sound not to permit Maersk Katarina into port. 
• USCG District 13 coordinates Strike team allocation with National 
Strike Force Coordination Center. 
• Command recommends holding Hyundai Pioneer outside port of Long 
Beach.  The vessel was later boarded and cleared as not a threat. 
• Armed Sea Marshals were placed aboard the Catalina ferry, 
apparently deterring an attack. 
   In Move 2 (14-21 November 2001), one week after the mobilization 
order, U.S. troops, weapons, and equipment begin flowing into ports in California 
and Washington.  Naval forces in Hawaii are prepared to deploy to augment the 
battle groups already in the Persian Gulf.  U.S. Special Operations Forces and 
Army light forces have arrived in theater.  War has not broken out but minor 
skirmishes along the border of the hostile country have begun drawing out 
casualties on all sides. 
One significant event for this move is an alert by the Office of Homeland 
Security that a possible nuclear device might arrive in San Francisco Bay by 07 
December (event 15).  A follow-on intelligence assessment reports Al Qaeda 
may have a “nuke” capability.  This report triggers a  slew of responses from the 
Command and District level stakeholders including: 
• Request for additional intelligence 
• Request for availability of FBI/ DOE Nuclear Emergency Search Team. 
• Discussion of maritime picture. 
• USCG District 11 (LA/LB) directed to undertake aggressive HUMINT 
and LEA collection 




• Higher Command Request for DOD to provide nuclear detection 
devices. 
In Move 3 (21-27 November 2001), military operations in the Middle East 
continue to ramp up with several cross-border air engagements taking place 
throughout the week.  Heavy infantry and combat support elements converge at 
the ports of embarkation in Oakland and Long Beach, ready to embark.  
Containerized munitions arrive in San Francisco/ Oakland for load-out and 
shipment to the Middle East. 
The first significant event from this move is the distribution of an Office of 
Homeland Security memorandum citing unspecified threats regarding an attack 
against the WTC/ Ferry building on the San Francisco Embarcadero (event 23).  
Because Higher Command ordered Armed Sea Marshals placed on ferries, no 
further action is taken against this threat. 
The second significant event is a CNN News report that the Liberian 
flagged crude oil tanker Pacific Liberty ignores demands to be boarded by USCG 
as it enters the Economic Exclusion Zone, approaching the California coast 
(event 26).     
• Higher Command requests that DOD place Special Operations 
Forces on alert for non-compliant boarding of Pacific Liberty. 
• Higher Command requests crew list and additional intelligence and 
is responded to with a report that crew list is in order and that there 
is no indication of a hijacking. 
• DoD requests USCG direct consequence management in the event 
of an attack from the Pacific Liberty. 
• USCG District 11 (LA/LB) requests DoD advise on availability of 
Army brown water vessels and California Air National guard armed 
helicopter support for augmentation to port security.   
Two additional events in this move are inserted to set up for Move 4: (1) Joint 




shipping blistering agent ideal for aerial application via Canada (event 29); and 
(2) Office of Naval Intelligence indicates that North Korea is providing adversary 
country agents with submersible/ swimmer attack training (event 29).  
In Move 4 (28 November – 04 December 2001), cross-border skirmishes 
continue between U.S. coalition forces and Middle East adversary forces.  Troop 
and equipment load-outs are in progress at all associated West Coast ports.  
Intelligence and Warning (I&W) received over the past two weeks against follow- 
on attacks on the U.S. has the state and local law enforcement and force 
protection communities on a high state of alert. 
During this move an apparent attack takes place on the U.S.  The Office of 
Homeland Security reports of a possible mining of choke points in Puget Sound 
by the Middle East adversary (event 32).  A USCG Cutter is damaged and the 
boarding party is reported missing when a vessel reporting itself as in distress 
explodes alongside (event 33).  In a similar attack, a sailboat approaches the 
Concord ammunition piers and detonates itself, destroying the cranes at the site 
(event 34).  Limpet mines were discovered attached to the hull of an MSC vessel 
in Oakland (event 36), and a Washington State ferry was over-flown and 
attacked by a crop duster armed with a blistering agent (event 37).  The crop 
duster was tracked and confirmed to have later crashed into the Space Needle in 
Seattle, Washington, leaving it with severe damage (event 37).  The Victoria 
Clipper, a hydrofoil-class ferry originating in Victoria, Canada, is hijacked en 
route to Seattle and diverts at high speed (40 knots) toward the Bangor 
Submarine Base via the Hood Canal, threatening SSBNs in port.    
At this point, the stakeholders are saturated with tasking resources in 
response to the events and are required to do some “out of the box” thinking.  
Some of the key actions and responses are: 
• Requests for additional intelligence. 
• Increase of surveillance ordered at Puget Sound by USCG District 13 
(Washington State).  
• Request by USCG District 13 for Navy Mine Warfare resources to be 




• Inquiry by USCG District 13 regarding NOAA asset capability for mine 
detection. 
• DoD prepares to deploy an Explosives Ordnance Disposal unit via 
Helicopter to suspected mine area and advises Command that Mine 
Counter Measure assets are ready to deploy. 
• No action is taken regarding USCG cutter attacked while answering 
SOS call. 
• No action was taken against attack on ammunition pier. 
• To counter the limpet mine/ attack swimmer attack, USCG District 11 
directs restriction of private and commercial to be controlled and 
authorized by the Captain of the Port and directs all USCG assets to 
carry concussion grenades. 
• DoD also recommends deployment of MK 6 Marine Mammal System 
used for mine detection. 
• The Puget Sound ferry was held outside of port and assets were 
directed to assist with decontamination. 
• The District 13 (Washington State) staff acknowledges that there is no 
good  surface capability to counter this high-speed hydrofoil threat.     
In Move 5 (5-11 December 2001), Hard and soft targets on both coasts 
have been attacked.  The president vows to “respond ‘in a dramatic’ fashion.”  
During the final move, a Carnival cruise ship is swarmed and attacked by 4-6 
small boats detonating themselves at the ship’s waterline (event 38), and the 
Sausalito ferry is hijacked and headed towards pier 39 at full speed (event 39).  
Also, the Phillips Marathon, an LNG tanker bound from Alaska to Japan failed to 
report on schedule.  Three of its crewmen were found dead at its Alaska terminal 
of origin (event 40).        
2. Competing Tensions and Choices 
As the stakeholder teams confronted escalating terrorist threats throughout 
the five moves, to the point of saturation, the teams validated three inherent 
tensions in the evolving MHLS/ MHLD related to this thesis: 




• Innate cultural differences between the Coast Guard and the Navy 
on how to mitigate maritime threats. 
• Balancing the “home” and “away” game resource challenges. 
First, The stakeholders found early in the first move that the Coast Guard 
is unable to sustain MARSEC 1 with its present resources.  The conventional 
wisdom would seem that an increase in the MARSEC level requires more 
resources.  This game found that, in truth, it is easier to achieve MARSEC 3 than 
MARSEC 1 or MARSEC 2.   
Under the MARSEC 3 security regime, the MARSEC level associated with 
a probable or imminent attack, a COTP has the authority to virtually shut down a 
port. The COTP can order a slew of measures including the suspension of 
loading and unloading cargo, suspend inbound and outbound transit, and 
increase security searches. 
The competing tension found inherent with setting MARSEC 3 was shown 
in Move 1 when the intelligence reports implicated the Hyundai Pioneer, bound 
for the port of Los Angeles/ Long Beach (LA/LB) as a potential WMD delivery 
vessel.  The first impulse for District 13 was to recommend closing down the port 
of Los Angeles /Long Beach for the duration of the military sealift loadout. 
A response from the port was that closing the port cost $50 billion/ year 
and that no other port could handle the volume of import and export handled by 
that sea port.  Even after threats were progressively deemed as credible, 
imminent, and underway, there was no further recommendation or order to close 
the ports found in the summary of moves. 
  Second, cultural differences between the Navy and Coast Guard were 
extensively visible throughout the moves.  One aspect of this cultural 
phenomenon is evident from opposing views on how to respond to a maritime 
threat.  During the moves, both the Navy and Coast Guard participants reached 
back to their own service’s strategic, tactical, and operational training and 




comfortable using Coast Guard assets initially and reluctant to request Navy 
assets until they were inundated with threats. 
To better illustrate, during the game there was a debate about what to do 
with the Maersk Katrina, the merchant ship reported on fire at the approaches to 
Puget Sound.  The Navy stakeholders interpreted the intelligence on the Maresk 
Katrina as a vessel with hostile intent.  The Navy’s reach back to service culture 
led to a recommendation that the vessel be boarded, disabled, or sunk --- that it 
should not be permitted to enter U.S. territorial waters.   
The Coast Guard, on the other hand surmised that the Maersk Katrina 
was not a threat.  The Coast Guard stakeholders reverted to their culture of a 
rescue service.  The Captain of the Port for Puget Sound was pre-occupied with 
planning a rescue of the Maersk Katrina and holding the vessel at the entrance to 
Puget Sound.          
This scenario was intentionally left vague and open ended.  The inference 
that there was a possibility that the Maersk Katrina carried a WMD was not 
confirmed.  However, each service had already made up its mind on how to 
address the threat.  A better understanding of each service’s true capabilities and 
limitations, as well as the effect of service culture is essential to NORTHCOM’s 
successful mission planning for MHLS/ MHLD mission. 
Third, there was a deficit of debate regarding “home” vs. “away” games 
during the game.  A common theme threaded throughout the game was the 
building momentum towards a major theater war overseas.  There was no known 
discussion reflected in the final report relating to this tension that is clearly there.   
The introduction to move two states that Pacific Fleet Naval Forces are 
ready for deployment from Hawaii to augment the naval footprint in the Persian 
Gulf.  There is no mention of a discussion over holding up the deployment of 
these forces as the intensity of attacks strengthens in the following moves.  Was 
there an assumption by the stakeholders that once combatants are earmarked 




echelon or reserve maritime forces the correct answer to augmenting the Coast 
Guard to repel a terrorist attack on the U.S. Homeland?      
3. Findings and Recommendations 
Because this was the first joint MHLS wargame since 9/11, the scenarios did 
not appear as far fetched as perhaps previous wargames of this nature.  Some 
valuable findings and recommendations pertaining to this thesis included in the 
final game report are summarized here.   
First, it was learned early in the game that in some ports, U.S. Coast 
Guard is unable to even meet Maritime Security (MARSEC) I protection levels 
with its current resources.  This is the lowest level of protection expected under 
the “new normalcy” security regime.  Recommendations by the key stakeholders 
were for the Commandant and Area Commanders to continue advocating for 
additional resources and advocacy to develop organic capabilities to support 
MARSEC I which are non-redundant with other agencies.  
Second, even with some credible threats in the later moves, all levels of 
the MHLS C2 structure were hesitant in raising the MARSEC levels.71  This 
problem dovetails into the problems experienced with the limited resources 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph.  The key stakeholders recommended that 
Command establish further guidance on raising/ lowering MARSEC levels for 
Operations NOBLE EAGLE and NEPTUNE SHIELD. 
    Third, the wargame found that DoD resources are not balanced for both 
Homeland Security (home game) and forward deployed (Away game) operations.  
Key stakeholders recommended DoD revise operational plans (OPLANS) for 
confirming/ meeting homeland security requirements. 
Finally, there were a series of findings that suggested the need for a 
maritime security/ defense commander or a maritime NORAD.   These findings 
included: 
                                            
71 In discussions with Coast Guard Officers while helping design the 2003 MHLS/D Wargame, I 
found that one reason for this hesitation is that in some ports, as the MARSEC levels increase, 
local and state police involvement is required.  The window for maintaining these security levels is 
very narrow (48-72 hours) because it draws state and local resources from their normal law 




• There was no central database from which the Coast Guard staffs could 
identify and locate DoD assets to call upon and pair up with MHLS 
tasking. 
• There was no Common Relevant Operating Picture (CROP) where USCG 
could track the movements of contacts of interest, white shipping, or 
military assets.   
• Operational seams were discovered throughout the wargame.  These 
were areas where confusion remained as to whom would be in charge.  
An example cited was the crop duster event, where there was no reaction 
by the players because of confusion as to whom would be responsible for 
mitigating this type of attack. 
• The Coast Guard lacks sensors that could assist in port security. Some 
existing sensor capabilities developed by DoD may already be available 
for deployment. New technology could be developed to deal with various 
surface, air, and subsurface threats.  
C. 2003 NPS MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY/ DEFENSE WARGAME 
The three-day Maritime Homeland Security/ Defense Wargame, also 
sponsored by Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) and 
Commander Coast Guard Pacific Area (PACAREA) took place on April 7-10, 
2003 at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, Ca.  This second 
wargame distinguishes itself as a case study in this thesis for two reasons.   
First, the wargame was held within weeks of the invasion of Iraq during 
the opening moves of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.  Thus, the order of battle 
for the game took into account deployed and surged forces, testing the feasibility 
of a concurrent home and away game.  Second, this was the first maritime 
wargame since the establishment of NORTHCOM where the new unified 
command was tested as the stove pipe for MHLD.  The game’s battle rhythm 
consisted of four “moves” with each “move” representing a week’s time, in real 




for plenary sessions to discuss actions taken during the moves and to brief the 
next move.    
1.  Game Objectives and Scenario/ Move Overview 
The game, set in real time with current world affairs, opens with the U.S. in a 
wartime posture.  The U.S. has deployed its air land and sea forces in the 
Arabian Gulf for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.  The opening salvos were fired 
just weeks before April 7, 2003, the first move of the wargame.  Throughout the 
week of April 7, the U.S. was at High Condition (Orange) under the current 
Department of Homeland Security Advisory System because of threats of 
terrorist attacks in retaliation for U.S. action against Iraq. 
As a game artifice, the initial scenario briefing postulated that maritime 
threats to the homeland existed to both the East and West Coasts.  However, 
due to game sponsor orientation, only threats to Pacific area interests were 
played out in full fidelity.  The principal objectives of the April 2003 Maritime 
Homeland Security and Maritime Homeland Defense wargame were to:72 
• Evaluate the effectiveness of recently developed operational plans and 
policies for MHLS and MHLD 
• Assess MHLS/MHLD transition dynamics among key operational 
stakeholders. 
• Evaluate the ability of current assignment of roles and responsibilities to 
counter diverse threats. 
• Evaluate the ability of current MHLS/ MHLD command and control 
arrangements to counter diverse threats. 
• Identify MHLS/ MHLD capabilities-based requirements for the Pacific 
area operation. 
The game examined MHLS/ MHLD operational integration in the Eastern 
Pacific Theater, specifically at the ports of San Diego, Honolulu, and Valdez, 
Alaska.  Because the summary of moves in the final report is classified, this 
thesis is unable to treat the moves in the same detail as the 2001 MHLS 
                                            
72 Dr. Kathleen Robertson, Maritime Homeland Security/ Defense Wargame Game Book, Naval 




wargame.  It is recommended that further research in this area include a study of 
the classified Final Game Report.  The game did include several plausible and 
carefully researched threats that should be considered and gamed further.  
Among the threats addressed by the stakeholders, the following presented the 
greatest tensions in the game: 
• Surveillance and hijacking of the Coronado Ferry in San Diego Harbor. 
• Biological attack on a cruise ship preparing to enter port in Honolulu 
• Hijacking of a semi-annual ammunition barge shipment from Seattle 
Washington to Valdez, Alaska 
• Purchase of Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats and mini-submarines 
• Mining of the entrance to San Diego Bay 
• Seaborne attack on critical infrastructure nodes in Hawaii and a coastal 
civilian nuclear power plant near San Diego. 
• Dirty bomb delivered to San Diego via a hijacked merchant ship. 
• Coordinated sea and air attack on Valdez terminal and Alaskan 
Pipeline. 
• Severed trans-Pacific connectivity in various C2 submarine cable 
connections. 
• Seaborne threats to nuclear-powered aircraft carriers moored in-port. 
2. Competing Tensions and Choices 
While classification of the wargame report precludes detailed discussion of 
specific game results, this thesis can address some important structural aspects 
of the game where competing tensions and choices were evident.  First, due to 
game sponsor orientation, almost all game events focused on Pacific area 
concerns.  Given the high fidelity play of Pacific area maritime threats, without 
commensurate attention given to suggested scenarios along the Atlantic or Gulf 
Coasts, NORTHCOM players and C2 arrangements were not stressed by the 




Even so, the need to perform effective C2 and allocate scarce resources 
in multiple disparate maritime locations in the Eastern Pacific area raised 
tensions, particularly between NORTHCOM and PACOM, regarding competing 
MHLS and MHLD responsibilities.  Had there been simultaneous play of full 
fidelity events on multiple coasts, the true effectiveness of the current C2 
arrangement for NAVNORTH would have undergone greater stress.  This seems 
particularly important for determining what triggers should be used to direct 
transitions from MHLS to MHLD, and back again to effect smoothly efficient and 
timely responses to urgent attack scenarios. 
Second, game sponsors intentionally constrained some red threat vectors 
in order to facilitate continued blue game play in operational modes that enabled 
blue to test their capabilities ”within the box.”  While that was deemed appropriate 
and necessary to meet sponsor objectives, it was not sufficient to fully test blue 
force capabilities and C2 effectiveness to deal with some already demonstrated 
red asymmetric threat vectors which may operate from “outside the box.” 
In particular, red exploitation of civil aviation vulnerabilities, both in general 
and commercial aviation fields, especially cargo aircraft that could potentially 
pose a 9/11-like threat to maritime related and key coastal infrastructure was 
excluded from play.  Also, potential red use of shoulder fired surface-to-air 
missiles “from the sea” was disallowed in game play. 
The game design in both the November 2001 and April 2003 wargames 
focused on a one-sided game, dynamic blue play against a static red threat.  
Given the operational limitations of non-state actor terrorists, this seems 
appropriate.  If NORTHCOM were to face MHLS and MHLD from another state 
actor however, more robust two-sided game designs would be needed.   
3. Findings and Recommendations 
Because this was the first major joint MHLS/ MHLD wargame involving 
NORTHCOM, the game presented some challenges which served to help shape 
NORTHCOM’s future maritime planning.  Some valuable findings and 




summarized here.  Again, because of the classification of the final report only the 
unclassified findings are presented here.  A review of the final report is 
recommended since many of the findings, insights, and recommendations that 
must be withheld here due to classification are pertinent to this thesis. 
First, the stakeholders found that in addition to their MHLS role, the USCG 
can also be effective as a MHLD commander as tasked by the maritime 
component commander.  This is especially important for port areas where there 
is seldom any significant DoD force presence.  The key stakeholders 
recommended that USCG be integrated into the MHLD C2 architecture. 
Second, the game found some operational seams in the C2 structure, 
specifically when the threats were presented at the perimeters of the regional 
Combatant Commanders’ (COCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR).  For example, 
the C2 structure for Alaska was found confusing by the stakeholders, where 
ACCOM is responsible for land defense while PACOM is responsible for air and 
sea defense.  Here, the key stakeholders recommended restructuring the C2 
architecture so that NORTHCOM becomes responsible for Alaska.   This 
recommendation is valid since NORTHCOM coordinates regularly with Canada 
in the NORAD role.   
Another C2 issue found was that the structure for MHLD in Hawaii was at 
the Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF) level, not at the COCOM level.  The 
key stakeholders recommended that the MHLD C2 structure mirror the COCOM 
structure of NORTHCOM for maritime operations.  Also related to the C2 
problem, stakeholder teams found the Request For Forces process too slow in 
effectively reacting to actionable intelligence and recommended a more 
streamlined process be developed.   
Third, several threats crossed over from the territorial borders of Canada 
and Mexico where a maritime response would have required multi-national 
cooperation.  Mexico was of particular concern because of its border’s proximity 
to the second largest Fleet Concentration Area, San Diego.  While NORAD has 




either Canada or Mexico.  The key stakeholders recommended NORTHCOM 
negotiate formal agreements with Canada and Mexico for operations within its 
AOR. 







































VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  SUMMARY 
Irrefutably, an unchecked coordinated seaborne attack against one or 
more U.S. ports could exploit the Achilles Heel of the U.S.  With the seams 
rapidly closing on commercial and private air transportation security, the path of 
least resistance leads to the maritime domain.  This is a crucial time to close the 
gaps and seams in Maritime Homeland Security and Defense as we confront the 
challenges and threats posed against the United States by transnational 
terrorism and asymmetric warfare.  NORTHCOM faces the greatest challenge 
today unparalleled by any other regional commander --- deterring and defending 
against an attack on U.S. soil.  The horrific events of September 11, 2001 and its 
ripple effects elucidate that, in spite of the rhetoric, an attack on the U.S. is not 
the same as an attack on either its’ allies or interests.       
This thesis has examined the role U.S. Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM) is performing in the maritime domain as the new Unified 
Command responsible for homeland defense.  It has also illustrated the 
importance of a maritime force capable of responding to conventional as well as 
asymmetric threats within the maritime domain.  
Finally, this thesis has examined the challenges for NORTHCOM in the 
maritime domain as NORTHCOM’s mission continues to sharpen by identifying 
operational, structural, and cultural seams between Maritime Homeland Security 
and Homeland Defense. 
B. REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis set out to answer the primary question: Can NORTHCOM 
effectively accomplish maritime homeland defense and support homeland 
security without having permanently assigned maritime forces?  Initially, this 
thesis began with a presupposition that NORTHCOM could not function under 
the current MHLS/ MHLD regime.  After a careful study, however, this thesis 




NORTHCOM maritime planners should instead focus on overseeing 
experimentation and interoperability, beyond the horizon planning for the 
maritime defense forces. This thesis has shown that MHLS and MHLD require a 
team effort of Coast Guard, Navy and other federal stakeholders.  This level of 
coordination requires a Combatant Commander.  At minimum maritime forces 
should be made available for training and exercises to test the current structure 
beyond the scope of wargaming.    
In addition to the primary question, this thesis answered a succession of 
secondary questions, starting with:  What are the potential threats challenging 
NORTHCOM in the maritime domain?  This thesis classified the threats into Low, 
Middle, and High Impact.  These are clearly not all inclusive threats since by 
nature; asymmetric warfare is limited only by the imagination and creativity of 
weaker but motivated aggressor.  The essential takeaway is that the magnitude 
of an attack does not necessarily drive the impact.  A coordinated small boat 
attack in several unprotected ports, which registers as a low impact threat could 
have the same psychological and economic effects as a medium or high impact 
threat  in a single protected port.           
Secondly, this thesis sought to scrutinize the seam in transition from 
Maritime Homeland Security to Maritime Homeland Defense and explicate 
potential mission priority, service capability, and cultural mismatches, which 
could potentially stymie command and control in the transition from a MHLS to 
MHLD posture in the event of a seaborne terrorist attack.  This thesis has found 
that this seam has been identified and that the gap is only broadened by the 
service capabilities and service culture mismatches.  Hence, this area continues 
to be a work in progress. 
NORTHCOM will continue to be challenged by the divergent mission 
priorities and service cultures within the Navy and Coast Guard.  Policy for 
MHLS/ and MHLD will evolve more quickly than these two subsets.  
NORTHCOM will need to acknowledge the weaknesses in this area and drive the 




C. SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
This thesis only probes the surface of the challenges facing NORTHCOM.  
Since NORTHCOM was only fully operational as of September 11, 2003, it has 
not faced any known credible threats in the maritime domain.  This is the 
preeminent era for experimentation, exercising, and further wargaming of the 
maritime defense C2 construct.  Other reports and studies have been published 
since the information cut off date for this thesis including the Defense Science 
Board’s Summer 2003: Department of Defense Roles and Missions in Homeland 
Security.  There are some valuable insights here that should be studied further 
within the context of this thesis’ research area.   
This new Combatant Command will undergo some steep learning curves 
and face many hurdles along the way. This area is a “hotbed” for further research 
and policy development affecting MHLS and MHLD.  Also of interest will be the 
evolution of the relationship between Department of Defense and Department of 
Homeland Security along the seam of MHLS and MHLD.  NORTHCOM’s 
success in the maritime domain will hinge on its ability to coordinate and smooth 
the structural and cultural seams between the Navy and Coast Guard forces.     
Another area for further research is the impact of the Joint Harbor 
Operations Concept.  Further study and experimentation with expansion of this 
concept into non-military but critical U.S. ports like New York, Los Angeles/ Long 
Beach, and Miami may be the key to developing a much-needed “Maritime 
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